Georgia: An “existential” election

In the upcoming parliamentary election on 26 October, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party is seeking a fourth term in office after ousting its main rival, the United National Movement (UNM), in 2012. The standoff between the two parties is at times violent; however, GD may be more anxious about Georgia’s civil society rather than the fractured opposition.¹ This is exemplified by GD’s insistence on passing the foreign agent law despite external criticism and mass demonstrations within the country.² A wave of attacks on and harassment of protest leaders in May and June offers a preview of the tactics that could be employed should the unpredictable election outcome trigger another bout of unrest. 

A high-stakes exercise

Georgia’s outgoing president, Salome Zourabichvili, called the election “existential”³ — and it may indeed be critical for both incumbents and the opposition. Led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s,⁴ GD threatens to outlaw UNM and associated opposition groups should it regain the constitutional majority it held between 2016 and 2020.⁵ With its de facto leader, former President Mikheil Saakashvili, serving a long sentence for abuse of power while in office,⁶ UNM is a shadow of its former self. This is due to a substantial negative rating, internal rifts, and the proliferation of splinter groups.⁷ Nevertheless, UNM holds a quarter of parliamentary seats, and its members are victims of frequent targeted attacks. 

ACLED records at least 17 attacks against UNM members since 2018, when ACLED began collecting data for Georgia. Most of the time, the incidents involve beatings by unidentified perpetrators on the streets, though, in November 2023, two UNM members claimed that GD rivals shot at them in southern Georgia.⁸ There were also several instances of gunfire targeting party offices. Meanwhile, both GD and UNM were implicated in about 37 scuffles, mostly during public campaign events and voting in the 2018 presidential election, 2020 parliamentary elections, and 2021 local polls (see graph below). The current campaign has been remarkably calm, though GD leaders did place the blame for probable violence on opponents beforehand.⁹ 

Clampdown on civil society 

While threats against the opposition have mostly remained rhetorical, the foreign agent law has already put Georgia’s civil society to the test. The GD-dominated parliament passed the law on a second attempt amid mass protests and systematic intimidation of activists, including physical attacks. Civil society and media organizations, partially or fully foreign-funded, have been a thorn in the side of established and aspiring authoritarian regimes keen on controlling public space in Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.¹⁰ Russia’s government has been particularly notorious for muzzling critical voices by labeling them as ‘foreign agents’ — a term that invokes associations with treason in post-Communist countries rather than political lobbying.¹¹ 

GD first attempted to push through the foreign agent bill in spring 2023. Dubbed ‘the Russian law’ by opponents in Georgia, it requires that foreign-funded organizations register as promoters of foreign influence or face hefty fines.¹² The law encountered a large wave of demonstrations, of which some turned violent (see figure below). GD subsequently backtracked: it released most people detained during protests without charges and promised not to broach the bill again. More than caving in to protestors’ demands, the party may have been concerned about securing Georgia’s candidacy for membership in the European Union after failing to obtain it alongside Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022. Georgia was eventually granted the candidate status in December 2023.¹³ 

GD unexpectedly revived the foreign agent bill in April 2024, citing security threats posed by funds being funneled to NGOs.¹⁴ At about the same time, it rushed through a bill waiving taxes on offshore asset transfers to Georgia.¹⁵ Protestors returned to the streets, launching one of the largest demonstration waves in Georgia’s recent history, both in terms of duration and size.¹⁶ This time, however, GD’s parliamentary majority was implacable. The bill passed committee hearings and subsequent plenary votes despite non-stop demonstrations and external criticism, as well as threats of sanctions from the EU and the United States.¹⁷ On 29 April, GD bused in thousands of supporters for a rally in Tbilisi, during which Ivanishvili, GD’s founder, spoke at length about foreign meddling and vowed to repress not only longtime UNM foes but also opposition writ large.¹⁸ 

Tensions boiled over both within and outside parliament in May. In addition to police using heavy-handed tactics such as tear gas, water cannons, and often violent detentions on 13 and 14 May, protest leaders and journalists also faced beatings. In May and June, unidentified perpetrators carried out at least eight attacks against people participating in protests, including UNM members. The then-UNM leader, Levan Khabeishvili, also claimed police beat him up during a demonstration.¹⁹ Most incidents occurred in the capital, Tbilisi, and often outside victims’ residencies at night. Protesters and their families faced intimidating phone calls and harassment in public.²⁰ Apparent GD supporters vandalized the offices of opposition media outlets and NGOs.²¹ Additionally, on 1 June, several dozen men wielding sticks and stones attempted to break into UNM headquarters in Tbilisi. Another UNM office in Poti was vandalized later in June. 

Protests fizzled out after GD overcame the largely symbolic vetoing of the foreign agent law by President Zourabichvili.²² However, attacks against activists continued until mid-June when the Georgian football team’s landmark participation in the European championship likely diverted domestic attention.²³ By early September, 476 of about 4,000 active civil society organizations on Georgia’s public registrar submitted paperwork for foreign agent designation.²⁴ The rest are defying the provisions of the foreign agent law as it is being challenged in the Constitutional Court. The standoff may be resolved after the elections, the outcome of which is uncertain.

Risk of violence after elections

Held per proportional system with extensive electronic voting for the first time,²⁵ the elections may be decided by a third of voters whose preferences are yet unknown.²⁶ Turnout may prove key, as will the 5% threshold favoring bigger parties, though the opposition partially succeeded in forming coherent electoral alliances.²⁷

GD’s apparent acceptance of the fallout with the EU and especially the US²⁸ due to the passing of the foreign agent law may point to its prioritization of winning the election. To remain in power, it is running on a populist platform relying on social conservatism, underscored by claims of foreign interference.²⁹ Shortly before the electoral campaign recess in September, GD deputies severely restricted LGBTQ+ rights, likely to curry favor with voters in the Christian Orthodox majority country where queerphobia is common.³⁰ GD also appears to be instrumentalizing the trauma of the 2008 war with Russia over Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia. It alleges that a “global war party” is attempting to drag the country into Russia’s war against Ukraine by opening a “second front” against Russia.³¹ It has also used imagery of destruction in Ukraine in its campaign,³² amid an apparent rapprochement with Russia, which seconds GD’s claims of foreign meddling.³³

GD may be more concerned about possible post-election unrest, however. In 2003, an uprising dubbed ‘the Rose Revolution’ brought UNM to power. The arguably less-strained parliamentary elections in October-November 2020 prompted demonstrations contesting the outcome, though they were short-lived and mostly involved opposition members and supporters. This is in contrast to the wider, non-partisan masses of people who mobilized against the foreign agent law in the spring of 2023 and 2024, as well as in 2019 in reaction to the behavior of a Russian MP who, during a visit to the parliament, took the seat of the speaker.³⁴ Keeping in mind protesters’ mobilization potential, in October 2023, the GD-dominated parliament banned encampments during protests.³⁵

Should the opposition deem the score unfair and the public agree, another iteration of unrest could ensue, with the stakes for GD and its opponents higher than during the previous waves of mass demonstrations. The policing of demonstrations, protestors’ actions, and possible infiltration of gatherings by provocateurs, as well as the continuation of individual attacks against members of the opposition, media, and civil society, may decide whether the demonstrations would escalate or fizzle out. The lack of meaningful investigation and prosecution of police applying excessive force and attacks on demonstrators during the spring protests³⁶ is a worrying sign that points to the governing party’s tolerance, if not encouragement, of brute force to suppress dissent.

Correction: An earlier version of this report incorrectly said the incidents where two UNM members claimed GD rivals shot at them occurred in October and November 2023. The incidents occurred on 1 and 4 November.

Visuals in this report were produced by Christian Jaffe.