Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: September 2025

Brazil: Organized crime and land conflicts drive worsening violence in Maranhão

In August, violence in Maranhão state rose by around 70% compared to the previous month, reaching the highest levels since ACLED began coverage of the region in 2018. The increase in violence in Maranhão is part of a broader escalation in neighboring states and across Brazil’s northeast.¹ Much of the violence has been linked to the growing influence of organized crime. The Primeiro Comando do Maranhão and Bonde dos 40 criminal organizations are active in the state,² and dominant drug trafficking organizations, such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho, have intensified their activity in the Legal Amazon region.³ 

At the same time, conflicts over land and resources have fueled further violence in the state, particularly involving loggers and Indigenous communities. On 8 August, armed loggers attacked the Pyhcop Catiji Gavião community in the Governador Indigenous Territory, Amarante municipality, leaving one attacker dead after he attempted to invade the village. The incident followed weeks of tensions after community members discovered illegal timber extraction within their territory.⁴ These tensions were further fueled by the assault of an Indigenous man and intimidatory drone flights over the community. Loggers’ activities often intersect with those of criminal groups, who finance timber fraud and logging as a lucrative activity.⁵ 

In response to rising violence, state military police launched Operation Impact on 29 August, mobilizing about 1,500 officers for intensified patrols. Between 29 and 31 August, they seized 19 firearms and arrested 39 people.⁶ Also on 29 August, Maranhão civil police launched Operation Capture and arrested eight people between 29 and 31 August.⁷

Colombia: FARC dissidents launch deadly attacks in Cali and Amalfi in response to military operations

Violence between state forces and non-state armed groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, intensified in August. ACLED records at least 59 reported fatalities as a result of armed clashes, one of the highest monthly tolls since ACLED began coverage of the region in 2018. On 21 August, Iván Mordisco’s Central General Staff (EMC) claimed responsibility for a truck bomb near Cali’s Marco Fidel Suárez Air Base that killed six civilians and injured over 60. The same day, an armed group downed a police helicopter in Amalfi, Antioquia, killing 13 officers. While the government first attributed responsibility for the attack to the Gulf Clan and then the 36th front — a FARC dissident faction aligned with the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), a splinter group of the EMC — the National Liberation Army (ELN) later claimed responsibility for the incident.⁸ 

The government responded to the EMC attack with force by arresting Mordisco’s brother, long wanted for drug trafficking, on 22 August.⁹ Days later, security forces killed Willinton “Dumar” Vanegas, a commander of the Bloque Móvil Martín Villa, part of Mordisco’s EMC network,¹⁰ in El Retorno, Guaviare. This prompted retaliation, and residents temporarily detained 34 soldiers and pressed for the return of the rebel’s body. The soldiers were released three days later as a result of mediation facilitated by the Ombudsman’s office and the United Nations.¹¹ President Gustavo Petro called on the international community to designate Mordisco’s factions — along with other armed groups such as the Second Marquetalia and the Gulf Clan — as terrorist organizations and announced plans to pursue cases before the International Criminal Court.¹² 

Unlike its confrontational stance toward the EMC, the government maintained ongoing peace talks with the EMBF despite initial reports linking the helicopter attack to its 36th front. The ELN’s subsequent claim of responsibility highlights the fluid and overlapping dynamics of Colombia’s conflict, where multiple armed groups compete over the same territory and splinter. These divisions further highlight the challenges facing Petro’s administration in negotiating with multiple actors in a fractured landscape, while managing the risks of violence caused by splinter groups.

Guatemala: Prison security measures spark coordinated riots amid surging gang violence

In August, prisoners affiliated with the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (B-18) gangs staged 10 riots, some occurring simultaneously, in Fraijanes, Cuilapa, Escuintla, and Guatemala City prisons. During the riots, inmates took 39 people hostage, including prison staff and police guards; killed one guard; and injured an inmate. The government’s decision to transfer five MS-13 and five B-18 leaders to the Renovación I maximum-security facility triggered the unrest, as it prompted rioters from the two rival gangs to demand their relocation to separate centres.¹³ 

Riots and other violent incidents inside prisons have increased this year. ACLED records an increase from four events in 2024 to 19 in 2025. This increase has been driven largely by prisoners’ resistance to state measures designed to limit gangs’ control inside prisons and by clashes between inmates from rival gangs. The recent riots not only reflect the persistence of gang rivalries in prisons but also the structural weaknesses of Guatemala’s prison system, which is marked by overcrowding, underfunding, corruption, and a lack of clear protocols for handling hostage crises.¹⁴ Such conditions have enabled gangs to consolidate their power, often through colluding with security forces and external networks.¹⁵

Violence in prisons is unfolding against a backdrop of rising homicide across the country, attributed to a crackdown on criminal groups¹⁶ in Guatemala and abroad. These efforts have disrupted drug trafficking across borders¹⁷ and exacerbated domestic rivalries.

Haiti: Security forces re-take a telecommunications base in Kenscoff amid ongoing defiance of state authorities by gangs

On 7 August, Laurent Saint-Cyr, the Transitional Presidential Council’s representative for the private sector, assumed the council’s rotating presidency. In an attempt to disrupt the transition, Viv Ansanm launched coordinated offensives in three Port-au-Prince communes. The coalition directly challenged state authorities throughout the month by launching multiple attacks targeting state forces and infrastructure in Kenscoff, including an ambush of a police armoured vehicle on 12 August in which five gang members and two police officers were killed. On 20 August, destabilization efforts in the commune culminated in the takeover of a telecommunications base — a recurring target. Coalition forces threatened to disrupt telecommunication and air traffic, but police forces, supported by the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), regained control of the base on 25 August following anti-gang operations.

The critical security situation reignited discussions over international support. The Organization of American States (OAS) presented a roadmap and engaged in discussions with the United Nations and the Caribbean Community.¹⁸ The United States further announced plans to submit a joint proposal with Panama to the UN Security Council to rebrand the MSS into a Gang Suppression Force,¹⁹ set to be financed by the OAS’ Secure-Haiti project. In parallel, the head of Vector Global, American businessman Erick Prince’s private security firm, declared that troops would be deployed as part of an agreement with the Haitian authorities.²⁰ As reinforcements were being planned, Jimmy Chérizier, one of Viv Ansanm’s spokespersons, called on displaced residents to return to neighborhoods in central Port-au-Prince under gang control.²¹ The call was framed as a peace offering, but raised concerns that gangs could instrumentalize civilians to deter security operations in these neighborhoods.

Mexico: Violence intensifies in northern Veracruz state as criminal groups battle for control of extortion markets

Violence in Veracruz grew deadlier in August as a result of attacks in the northern municipalities of Tuxpan, Papantla, and Poza Rica that were likely perpetrated by organized crime groups. In these areas, Grupo Sombra, a splinter group of the Gulf Cartel, disputed the Jalisco New Generation Cartel’s (CJNG) control of extortion markets. On 2 August, in Papantla, Grupo Sombra members abandoned six dismembered bodies, including that of a police officer accused of having ties with the CJNG. The group’s influence, which it exercises through extortion schemes, also reaches inside penitentiary facilities. On the same day, eight inmates were killed during a riot in Tuxpan prison, where prisoners alleged that Grupo Sombra is running extortion rackets with the support of prison authorities. 

Thus far in 2025, ACLED records a 37% increase in violence in Veracruz compared to the previous eight months of 2024. Although violence levels in August remained comparable to those in July, the number of reported fatalities rose. In response, federal authorities announced a new joint anti-extortion operation with state officials, which is aimed at arresting criminal leaders and investigating municipal and state authorities suspected of colluding with criminal groups.²²

Venezuela: Venezuela mobilizes forces as US deploys military assets in the Caribbean

The US deployed multiple warships and 4,500 personnel to the Caribbean in August in what it described as an effort to dismantle drug trafficking groups, including organizations it has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. As part of this deployment, Washington cited efforts to combat Latin American drug cartels, particularly those allegedly linked to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the Cartel of the Suns.²³ The deployment includes guided-missile destroyers, a cruiser, and a nuclear-powered fast attack submarine. In response, Venezuela has mobilized warships, drones, larger naval vessels, and 15,000 soldiers to patrol its coastline and the border with Colombia.²⁴ The government also called on civilians to join militias and denounced US actions at the UN as a threat to regional stability.²⁵ Tensions further escalated at the beginning of September, when the US carried out a strike and killed 11 people on a ship departing from Venezuela, which it accused of belonging to the Tren de Aragua criminal organization and participating in trafficking operations. 

The standoff highlights a broader pattern of heightened US interventionism in the hemisphere, echoing threats of cross-border action in Mexico under Donald Trump’s anti-cartel strategy and raising concerns over sovereignty, regional security, and the militarization of counter-narcotics operations.²⁶