Q&A: Sectarian tensions and Israeli strategy in southern Syria

The events of July 2025 in southern Syria — particularly in the Druze-majority city of al-Suwayda — have drawn renewed attention to a volatile frontier. Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the provinces of al-Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra have experienced a sharp rise in political violence, driven by sectarian tensions, local power struggles, and foreign interventions. In this Q&A, ACLED Middle East Analyst Nancy Ezzeddine explores the roots of the recent escalation, the role of Druze factions and tribal actors, and Israel’s evolving posture toward the area.

What is driving the violence in al-Suwayda?

On 13 July 2025, deadly clashes erupted in the countryside west of al-Suwayda following the abduction and reported execution of three Druze shepherds near the village of Walga.¹ The perpetrators were identified as members of armed Sunni Bedouin tribes. Retaliatory raids quickly followed, as Druze factions attacked tribal encampments, prompting days of escalating violence. Tensions between Druze and Bedouin groups have deepened in recent months due to disputes over land, smuggling routes, and control over local security arrangements.² While these events marked a sharp spike in hostilities, they were not unprecedented: Between  January and 25 July 2025, ACLED records 133 incidents of sectarian violence in al-Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra, and at least 832 fatalities. Notable episodes include the April 2025 ambush in Buraq and the May 2025 protests in Busra al-Harir. Both highlight the fraught nature of territorial and political competition in the region.

How is the current episode different?

The July 2025 clashes have been the deadliest yet. ACLED records 95 incidents between 13 and 25 July alone, resulting in over 800 reported deaths and mass displacement (see map below). What sets this escalation apart is its capacity to momentarily unify fractured Druze factions — including groups that had previously disagreed — in shared resistance against perceived aggression by Bedouin tribes and the transitional government’s failure to protect their communities. Some factions, like Liwa al-Jabal and Rijal al-Karama, abandoned earlier pragmatism to denounce government-aligned forces. The result is a fragile new status quo: Since around 20 July, Druze militias have controlled most of the province, now surrounded by mobilized Bedouin tribesmen and formally deployed government security forces, effectively cutting the province off. Humanitarian corridors have reopened, and some displaced Bedouins have left for ad hoc camps in neighboring Daraa, but tensions remain high as both sides brace for further unrest.

How has the Syrian transitional government responded to the escalation?

The Syrian transitional government deployed forces to al-Suwayda on 14 July, citing a mission to restore order. However, Druze leaders accused the military of siding with Bedouin tribes and shelling Druze areas. ACLED confirms nine such incidents. The transitional period has been marked by a fragile and contested security environment. Syrian Armed Forces have been selectively deployed and are often distrusted in the south. In this governance vacuum, informal militias, tribal forces, and criminal networks increasingly determine security arrangements on the ground. As a result, a growing number of Druze armed groups — including, for example, Rijal al-Karama, the Suwayda Military Council, and Sheikh al-Karama Forces — have emerged or reconstituted. However, the transitional government’s frequent coordination with Sunni Bedouin tribal networks amid recurrent clashes with local Druze militias has deepened Druze mistrust. Ceasefires were announced on 15, 16, and 19 July and were accompanied by troop withdrawals, reinforced administrative boundaries, and provisions for local patrols. Yet these efforts failed to gain credibility among key Druze leaders, most notably Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who rejected the deals.

How has Israel responded to the violence in southern Syria? 

Israel’s response to the July 2025 clashes in al-Suwayda reflects a dual strategy of deterrence and containment. While Israel has long targeted Iranian, Hezbollah, and Assad regime infrastructure in Syria, since the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli forces have increasingly intervened in southern Syria more directly in relation to Druze-Bedouin tensions (see map below). On 14 July, Israeli forces struck a Syrian military compound in Damascus, widely interpreted as a signal to the transitional government amid accusations of regime complicity in abuses against Druze civilians. This was followed by 15 incidents of Israeli strikes on Bedouin and regime positions in southern Syria, ostensibly to protect Druze areas from further incursions. These moves, however, also reflect broader Israeli goals of preventing the Syrian army from gaining control of southern Syria and expanding the demilitarized buffer zone along its borders, offering strategic depth and surveillance advantages into both Syria and Lebanon.

How have local Druze communities responded to Israel’s actions in Syria?

Although Israel claims that such strikes are meant to deter attacks on Druze civilians and prevent border spillover, local communities remain divided in their reactions. Some Druze activists have accused Israel of instrumentalizing their suffering, while others point to discreet aid, such as the reported issuance of Golan work permits and intelligence sharing, as evidence that Israel is acting in their favor. However, Israel’s selective involvement also risks deepening local mistrust within the Druze community, exacerbating sectarian grievances, and reinforcing external perceptions of opportunistic foreign meddling in an already volatile landscape. In doing so, Israel’s actions may inadvertently prolong instability and complicate the prospects of a durable political settlement in southern Syria.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.