Five key takeaways from the 2024 elections in Mexico

This is the fourth and final report in ACLED’s Mexico Special Election Series.

On 2 June, Claudia Sheinbaum, running for the ruling National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, won the presidential election with almost 60% of the votes, becoming the first female president in the country’s history. Alongside the presidential election, voters in Mexico concurrently participated in legislative, state, and municipal elections. The election was marred by assassinations and targeted attacks on candidates and other political figures. ACLED records over 330 incidents of violence targeting political figures during the election campaign, between the start of the federal campaign on 1 March and the voting day on 2 June. At least 95 incidents led to one or more reported deaths. The level of violence during this election campaign marks a record high that eclipses the violence recorded in the 2018 general and 2021 federal elections, which had 254 and 257 events, respectively.

The heightened levels of violence during the 2024 campaign period also affected candidates who were not directly targeted in violent incidents. At least 553 candidates requested state protection after receiving threats,¹ while others decided to withdraw from the race as a result of threats.² Notwithstanding, none of the main presidential candidates have made substantial proposals to address this issue.

This report explores the main trends of the 2024 electoral cycle:³

• Violent attacks are perpetrated mostly at the local level: Of the 216 events targeting candidates or their supporters or relatives, over 80% involved candidacies for local posts.
• Perpetrators relentlessly attempt to exert pressure on local authorities: Current and former officials not running for office were also targeted in over 40% of events.
• Violence targeting political figures happens beyond the campaign period: While violence escalates during the electoral campaign, it starts to increase from the very outset of the electoral cycle and continues well beyond the voting day.
• Organized crime groups’ competition is driving much of the violence: Six of the 10 states that recorded the most events of violence against political figures are also among the 10 most affected by gang violence, but with some notable exceptions.
• Competition between power brokers on the local level is also a significant driver of violence: Less-violent types of disorder, such as rioting and property destruction, make up around 30% of the events, displaying that not only organized crime, but also local power struggles and communal claims of irregularities during the process or rejection of the results may spark violence against political figures.

Violent attacks are perpetrated mostly at the local level

Around 40% of violent events during the 2024 electoral cycle targeted candidates running for office. While local, state, and federal elections were held on the same day, of the 216 violent incidents where candidates or their relatives or supporters were targeted, over 80% targeted political figures running for local office, including for mayor and municipal council seats. The remaining 20% includes the targeting of people running for federal offices and former candidates.

Veracruz provides a noteworthy example of how local elections can drive violence. Unlike most federal entities holding municipal elections in 2024, Veracruz will hold these elections in 2025. During the last municipal elections in 2021, Veracruz was the state with the highest level of violence targeting political figures, with 57 events recorded in the six months leading up to the vote and the two weeks that followed. This time, however, ACLED records about a quarter of the 2021 figure — 17 events — in Veracruz, dropping the state to 10th in the ranking (see graph below). The dramatic change in levels of violence underlines how the absence of municipal elections may correlate with reduced violence.

Elsewhere, the holding of local elections also resulted in a high level of violence targeting officials, civil servants, and candidates as a result of intense competition for power, with a significant number of candidates running in local elections targeted by organized crime groups and political rivals. Candidates were particularly vulnerable in the states of Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, and Puebla, where they represent the largest share of the victims. However, attacks against candidates are deadlier in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero, where 21 and 20 people died in violent incidents involving candidates.

Though at a lower scale, elections for state officials — such as governors and state deputies — are also drivers of violence. Several candidates for state congress were targeted in this electoral cycle, particularly in states where gubernatorial elections were held. In Chiapas and Morelos, armed men targeted two candidates for state senator with the Strength and Heart for Mexico coalition, while in Veracruz, armed men shot and killed the MORENA candidate for state deputy. These examples indicate that while local elections are a major trigger of political violence, significant state-level contests can also contribute to the violence observed in 2024.

Out of all recorded incidents since the start of the electoral process, at least 69 targeted women — several of them candidates for office — a number that accounts for 13% of the violence. However, this should not be interpreted as women being less likely to be targeted. Despite the 2024 elections being highlighted by women’s candidacies for the presidency, Sheinbaum’s subsequent victory, and directives from the National Electoral Institute for parties to ensure gender parity in candidacies, women remain underrepresented in local official bodies. In 2023, only 28% of local positions were held by women.⁴ In fact, women candidates received more threats than men during the 2024 electoral process,⁵ often pushing them to withdraw from the race, as was the case for 217 women candidates in Zacatecas alone.⁶

Perpetrators relentlessly attempt to exert pressure on local authorities

Candidates were not the only political figures exposed to violence in the current electoral cycle. Over 40% of the 540 incidents of targeted violence were directed at current and former officials not running in the election, such as mayors and civil servants. The persistence of violence toward these officials and civil servants indicates an intention to exert pressure on political processes beyond the elections.

ACLED data reveal that civil servants across different sectors are affected. Officials involved in judicial and security matters and public administration treasurers were the most frequent targets of non-elected officials. This trend is largely attributable to organized crime groups’ interests in controlling local resources and key administrative areas, like security and the judiciary, that can affect their activities. In fact, officials and civil servants who are not running in elections are targeted throughout the country, but they represent a larger share of the victims in states severely affected by gang-related violence such as Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán.

Relatives of politicians were also among the victims of around 14% of the attacks targeting a politician, either as direct targets or related victims. Often, violence against relatives reflects an intention to exert pressure on a political figure. For instance, in October 2023, alleged members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) attempted to kill the brother of Tacámbaro’s mayor — himself a former mayor — after the group issued threats against him and his treasurer. In at least 28% of these cases, the targeted relatives were also civil servants or politicians, underscoring that a few families hold political power but are not spared by attacks, especially in states like Guerrero, Michoacán, and Puebla.

A notable example is the influential Salgado family from Guerrero state. Several Salgado family members hold elected office, and they have also been the target of threats and attacks in recent years. On one such occasion, Zulma Carvajal Salgado — a cousin of Guerrero Governor Evelyn Salgado Pineda, who herself succeeded her father, Félix Salgado Macedonio — was the victim in August 2023 of an attack that resulted in the death of her husband. The attack occurred shortly after she announced her intention to run in the Iguala municipal elections.

Electoral violence happens beyond the campaign period

As in previous electoral processes, disorder ahead of the election started to increase even before the campaigns officially kicked off. Violence targeting political figures experienced a first uptick in October 2023, shortly after the start of a period called apoyo ciudadano, or citizen support, which was initiated on 9 September 2023 in some states. During this period, aspiring candidates for the presidency, senate, and federal councils gather signatures to run as independent candidates. After levels remained relatively consistent between November 2023 and January 2024, violent events targeting political figures substantially increased in February (see graph below). This increase coincided with the end of most states’ so-called pre-campaign period, when aspiring candidates for political parties carry out public activities to gather support for their nominations.

The violence against political figures that occurs early in the electoral cycle is usually related to the perpetrators’ intention to mark the territory. A violent incident signals that the area is under their influence and aims to prevent aspiring candidates who are perceived as threatening or unaligned from running.⁷ Most of the victims targeted in at least 34 events recorded in October 2023 were current or former local representatives and their relatives, but some were seeking to become candidates. For example, the mayor of the Cuauhtémoc district of Mexico City was seeking to become a candidate for the head of the Mexico City government for the Party of the Democratic Revolution when she was attacked by a group of individuals while visiting the capital’s food supply center on 4 October.

It is once the candidacies are defined, however, that the violence against political figures spikes, as the targets of those who seek to influence the races through violent means become more identifiable. Since the start of the campaign for federal and state elections in March and of local elections in April, violence against political figures increased exponentially, reaching a peak of 132 events in May, resulting in 55 fatalities, and marking a record on both counts since ACLED started to cover the country in January 2018. Election day was the single day with the highest number of events targeting political figures, with 80 recorded events.

Notwithstanding, the risks for political figures are unlikely to cease after the elections. In Guanajuato, for instance, armed men attacked the business of Tarimoro’s mayor-elect days after he won the election.⁸ Previous election cycles further suggest that not only will violence remain high at least until the swearing-in ceremonies, but it will further continue under the incoming administrations. ACLED records 210 and 179 events in the six months after the 2018 and 2021 elections, respectively, as well as constant levels of violence throughout the years, totaling nearly 3,000 incidents of violence targeting political figures since coverage began.

Organized crime groups’ competition is driving much of the election-related violence

ACLED records high levels of violence targeting political figures in Guanajuato and Michoacán states, two of the federal entities most affected by gang violence in the year leading up to the 2024 vote, confirming that, in some states, criminal groups’ competition drives violence against political figures. Six of the 10 states that record the highest levels of incidents targeting political figures during the electoral cycle are also among the 10 most affected by gang-related violence in the same time period (see map below). This is particularly true for Guerrero, which ranks second for the number of violent incidents targeting political figures but first for the number of people killed in these attacks and fifth for violence likely related to organized crime during the electoral cycle (see table below). In Chiapas, the state with the highest levels of violence against political figures during this electoral process, rising violence linked to the rivalry between the CJNG and Sinaloa cartel contributed to a 90% increase in violence targeting political figures compared to the 2021 electoral cycle. The high level of violence led to the cancellation of the vote in Chicomuselo and Pantelhó.⁹

However, there are exceptions to this rule, particularly when an organized crime group exerts hegemony locally. The states of Jalisco and Sinaloa are, in fact, among the 10 most affected by organized crime violence but not among those with most events of violence targeting political figures. They are also, respectively, the strongholds of the CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel, suggesting that their influence on local politics may be such that they do not need to resort to violence against political figures to consolidate it.¹⁰ Much of the violence recorded in those states stems from these groups’ tactics to exert their territorial control, and it may occasionally be related to localized disputes with minor groups, such as in the case of violence involving the Nueva Plaza cartel in the Tlajomulco area.¹¹

In a few cases, however, the presence of a strong political establishment dominated by a few families also contributes to low levels of violence against political figures. Nuevo León is a case in point. Despite some of the highest levels of organized crime violence, violent incidents targeting political figures have remained limited over the past year. Nuevo León is the second-richest state in the country, with an economy spearheaded by the export-oriented manufacturing industry. Most wealth and political power is concentrated among a small number of families. The leading candidates for governor in the 2021 elections, some of whom are part of these families, have been accused of links with criminal organizations such as Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel (CDG).¹² Furthermore, since the breakdown of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) hegemony in the 1990s, the state has been ruled by either the Citizens’ Movement or independent candidates, but MORENA has not been able to make significant inroads in the state’s political sphere.¹² In the latest election it only won two of the state’s 51 municipalities.¹³

Competition between power brokers on the local level is also a significant driver of violence

Beyond direct attacks on political figures, a significant share of incidents — 30% — took the form of rioting and property destruction. These events were linked to either the expression of public discontent toward local representatives or rivalries between competing political actors. They were particularly prominent in Chiapas, Puebla, and Hidalgo (see graph below). These three states are more permeable to local power struggles and electoral disputes due to pre-existing intercommunal conflicts and the concentration of power into the hands of local power brokers, or caciques.

Before the electoral campaigns began, this violence erupted largely during demonstrations where representatives were confronted for failing to meet demonstrators’ demands. However, political contenders have also been reported to sponsor or engage in property destruction and mob violence to intimidate adversaries. These events notably increased during the electoral campaign in April and May and included physical aggressions on party supporters and attacks on the properties of candidates and officials. For example, on 15 May, in Tlanchinol, Hidalgo, armed men shot at a vehicle stationed in front of the house of the candidate seeking to integrate the municipal council for the MORENA-PANAL alliance, who had complained of receiving threats ahead of the election.

Finally, riots around election day are often related to the rejection of results or claims of irregularities during the process or vote-buying by a candidate. For example, on 1 June, in Puebla, a group of 200 people, including PRI and National Action Party (PAN) supporters, physically attacked MORENA members in Venustiano Carranza over alleged vote buying. Due to the incident, the State Electoral Institution decided to cancel the election results over irregularities.¹⁴ Similarly, in Chenalhó, Chiapas, supporters of the Green Party of Mexico clashed during an assembly to elect their representatives, with some alleging that the mayor orchestrated the unrest to prevent his candidate from losing.

Visuals were produced by Ana Marco.

Contribution of The University of Texas at Austin (UT)

The data used for this report was enriched by the work of students of the University of Texas at Austin (UT). These include Cristobal Alcantara, Dina Elsaid, Anshumi Jhaveri, Holly Moyers, Jasmine Panjwani, and Ethan Thomas, under the direction of Dr. Ashley Moran in the UT Government Department. UT identified and tagged almost 1,900 events of election-related disorder, as well as violent events targeting national administrators in Mexico between January 2018 and May 2024. The project contributes to the tracking of violence targeting administrators and understanding their manifestations in national and subnational political settings. Similarly, the election-related disorder tags allow the tracking of unrest that arises during electoral processes, such as violence targeting electoral infrastructure and officials, demonstrations linked to elections (e.g. electoral reforms, contestation of results, etc.), and also violence against relatives of politicians, which, in the Mexican context, is a tool frequently used by power brokers to put pressure on political figures.